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DEATH

BY A SINGLE SENTENCE
By Danielle DalPorto
In 1984, Victor Taylor, a 24-year-old Black man, was sentenced to death for the murder of two white teenagers in Louisville,
Kentucky.1 His cousin and co-defendant received a life sentence.2 While the details of the crime are horrific,3 the author has
omitted them from this analysis: One’s constitutional rights are not contingent on the severity of the crime he has allegedly
committed. The United States Constitution is exceedingly clear on this point, containing several safeguards to protect the
rights of criminal defendants—none of which have provided any relief for Taylor. In fact, courts have repeatedly failed to
uphold his constitutional rights, specifically his Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection under the law.4 Most
recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus claim,5 relying on a flimsy
interpretation of a procedural technicality. Worse than that, the court’s decision essentially punishes Taylor (and his counsel)
for being too thorough in trying to appeal his death sentence.
Procedural History

It is impossible to analyze this case without
the context of Batson v. Kentucky,6 which
was decided three weeks before the trial
court judge sentenced Taylor to death.7 In
Batson, the Supreme Court ruled that striking
Black members of a jury pool based on their
race violates the Equal Protection rights
of Black defendants under the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 This decision overturned Swain
v. Alabama,9 which required a defendant to
show that the prosecutor had a systematic
practice of excluding Black jurors from all
criminal cases. As one of the dissenting judges
from the Sixth Circuit points out, after Batson,
excluding even one juror on the basis of race
is unconstitutional.10 Taylor has maintained
that his rights were violated under Batson
throughout almost four decades of appeals.

Taylor I

Taylor raised a Batson claim in his first
appeal directly to the Kentucky Supreme
Court (Taylor I), arguing that the prosecutor
excluded Black members of the jury pool
because of their race.11 Specifically, he argued
that the prosecutor violated Batson by using
half of his peremptory strikes to eliminate
two-thirds of potential Black jurors without
an alternative explanation.12 The court
summarily denied this claim and 41 others,
choosing to expound on only two of Taylor’s

assignments of error. It explained: “We have
carefully reviewed all of the issues presented
by Taylor…. Allegations of error which we
consider to be without merit will not be
addressed here.”13 The word “Batson” does
not appear anywhere in the opinion.

Taylor II

Seven years later, Taylor filed for postconviction relief (Taylor II) under a local
rule that barred him from bringing claims
already adjudicated on direct review.14 As this
precluded him from relying on Batson, he
argued instead that the prosecutor violated
his Equal Protection rights under Swain.15
To meet Swain’s higher burden of showing a
systematic practice of discrimination, Taylor
introduced five new pieces of evidence,
including passages from the Kentucky
Prosecutor’s Handbook listing jurors of the
same race or national origin as the defendant
as “not preferable.”16 While the dissent
found this a clear violation of both Swain
and Batson,17 the majority failed to address
the issue head on. Instead, it categorized the
claim as “an attempt to get around a longestablished rule.”18 In the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s view, invoking Swain was an attempt
to retry the Batson claim, which was already
reviewed on direct appeal.19 Therefore,
additional evidence of discriminatory
practices was irrelevant.20

While the merits of such a narrow holding
are debatable—to say the least—the
court’s analysis did not stop there. It went
on to state that even if Taylor could bring a
Batson claim in this appeal, it would fail on
the merits.21 Here, the majority contended
that a successful Batson claim requires a
showing of “other relevant circumstances”
that create an inference that the prosecutor
struck potential jurors on the basis of race.22
By this logic, Taylor’s original argument—or
any argument based solely on the number
of peremptory strikes used on Black jurors—
could never prove a Batson violation. Once
again, the court denied relief.23

Taylor v. Jordan

Nearly 20 years later, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals heard the case en banc, and like every
court before it, failed to provide Taylor any
relief.24 Somewhat surprisingly, the majority
conceded that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Taylor II misconstrued Batson.25
It accepted Taylor’s argument that Batson
does not require a showing of “other relevant
circumstances,” yet decided to ignore this
blatant misapplication of federal law. Instead,
the court opted to review the Batson claim
under the brief analysis in Taylor I,26 which
denied the claim and 41 others in a single
sentence.27
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The standard for such summary denials is
extremely deferential; courts need only find
that “any fair-minded jurist” could have
adopted an argument or theory in support of
the claim in question.28 The majority—over
the objections of one dissenting judge who
found the racially-motivated jury selection
so blatant that no fair-minded jurist could
disagree29—ruled that this standard was
met.30 The possible Batson violation is a
point of contention between the majority and
the dissenters, but because of the degree
of deference the majority employed here,
it is not an issue that the majority gave
substantial weight to.
As dissenting Judge Moore argued , the
majority did not have to ignore Taylor II in
favor of “read[ing] tea leaves” in Taylor I.31
Indeed, the majority could have “looked
through” Taylor I
to Taylor II and imputed the latter’s error to
the former—and therefore overturn Taylor
II based on its clear misconstrual of federal
law—a precedent set by Wilson v. Sellers.32
The majority rejected this argument, pointing
out that Wilson only applies in instances
where a court summarily affirms a lower
court’s reasoning (as opposed to a later
decision by the same court).33 However, as
Moore argues, there is no reason why Wilson
cannot apply, as it stands for the proposition
that “courts should defer to the last related
state-court decision that does provide a
relevant rationale.”34 Here, the majority chose
to evaluate what the court could have meant
in its one sentence denial instead of what the
same court—including a judge who joined
both opinions35—actually said.

The dissenting opinions explain exactly how
Taylor’s constitutional rights were violated.
They do not note, however, the contempt
that the majority seems to have for Taylor’s
insistence on pursuing these rights in the
first place. The majority opinion emphasized
the length of his appeal several times, noting,
almost tangentially, that his brief was 145
pages long and included 44 claims for relief.36
The court goes on to explain that it cannot
blame state courts for issuing summary
denials, especially in cases like Taylor’s, in
which “the petitioner presented the state court
with literally dozens of claims for relief.”37 The
majority’s focus on the thoroughness of this
appeal is particularly baffling here, considering
the stakes. Yes, Taylor presented “literally
dozens” of claims; for him, the stakes are
literally life or death. This sort of language not
only obfuscates the importance of carefully
considering each claim, it also raises an
ethical question about summary denials in
death penalty cases. As it stands, the state of
Kentucky derives the authority to kill Taylor
from a one-sentence denial of relief with no
substantive rationale behind it.
Ultimately, there were a number of avenues
through which the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals could have protected Taylor’s
constitutional rights, saving his life in the
process. Its failure to do so in this way—
using the strictest interpretation of a
procedural issue—is perhaps the cruelest.
Taylor remains on death row because of a
state court’s decision to write only a few
words, allowing subsequent courts to grant it
the highest level of deference.
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